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I. CHAPLINSKY V. NEW HAMPSHIRE
A. Order and Morality
In 1942, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,' a unanimous Supreme Court in
an opinion written by Justice Frank Murphy, upheld the conviction for a
Jehovah's Witness named Walter Chaplinksy for violating a New Hampshire
statute that read:
317
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1. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
No person shall address any offensive, derisive or annoying word to
any other person who is lawfully in any street or other public place,
nor call him by any offensive or derisive name, nor make any noise
or exclamation in his presence and hearing with intent to deride,
offend or annoy him, or to prevent him from pursuing his lawful
business or occupation.2
Chaplinsky became agitated when a City Marshal attempted to quell
him while making a speech on the streets of Rochester, New Hampshire.3
Chaplinsky told the Marshal, "'You are a God damned racketeer' and 'a
damned Fascist and the whole government of Rochester are Fascists or
agents of Fascists.',
4
In an opinion for the Court affirming Chaplinsky's conviction for
speaking these words, Justice Murphy wrote a paragraph that would come to
be one of the single most powerful and oft-cited passages in all of American
free speech law:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of
speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been
thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd
and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or
"fighting" words-those which by their very utterance inflict injury
or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has been well
observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition
of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that
any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by
the social interest in order and morality.'
This is an elegant paragraph, remarkable for its efficiency. I wish to
isolate for inspection Justice Murphy's suggestion that there are words
"which by their very utterance inflict injury." Simultaneously, I wish to
isolate Justice Murphy's theoretical justification that such words may be
banished from society because such classes of expression are "of such slight
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them
is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality." 6
To the extent that Chaplinsky is understood as standing for the
proposition that speech tending to incite an immediate breach of peace is not
protected by the First Amendment, it was and is an unremarkable opinion,
2. Id. at 569.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 571-72.
6. Id.
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then and now. To the extent that Chaplinsky stands for the broader
philosophical proposition that society may in appropriate circumstances
curtail expression to deter immediate threats to order, it is equally
unremarkable.
What makes Chaplinsky quite remarkable however, is the suggestion
that there are occasions when words alone may inflict injury that society
may redress without abridging the guarantees of the First Amendment,
including injury to society's moral fabric. 7 It is this more profound
possibility, that expression may be regulated in the service of both order and
morality, that continues to vex free speech doctrine and theory, and renders
the ongoing interpretation of Chaplinsky worth serious investigation.
B. Chaplinksy's Staying Power
The passage from Chaplinsky that is under inspection is often cited. In
the Supreme Court alone, Chaplinsky has been cited in at least 109
opinions,8 and often the entire passage above, or substantial portions of it,
are quoted.9
Chaplinsky may be usefully invoked either in the service of contracting
protection for freedom of speech or in the service of expanding it.
Chaplinsky was itself a speech-limiting decision, holding that there are
categories of speech that may be proscribed without violating the
Constitution.' ° It is not surprising, then, to find Chaplinsky invoked in
judicial decisions defending restrictions on speech, and there are many
prominent examples of this usage.
7. See id.
8. These include full opinions of the Court, as well as concurring or dissenting opinions.
9. See, e.g, Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 385 (1974); Terminiello v. City of Chi.,
337 U.S. 1, 26 (1949); Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 132 (1974).
10. See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573 (noting that "[w]e are unable to say that the limited scope of
the statute as thus construed contravenes the Constitutional right of free expression. It is a statute
narrowly drawn and limited to define and punish specific conduct lying within the domain of state
power, the use in a public place of words likely to cause a breach of peace").
I1. See, e.g, Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2630 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting
from the Chaplinsky passage in the course of arguing that public school officials should have
unfettered power under the First Amendment to punish offensive language by students); Bethel Sch.
Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986) (citing Chaplinsky in sustaining authority of
school officials to discipline student for sexually suggestive speech); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S.
747, 754 (1982) (quoting the Chaplinsky passage in support of upholding a New York child
pornography law); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 746 (1978) (Stevens, J., plurality opinion)
(quoting the Chaplinsky passage in the course of upholding FCC sanctions against a radio
broadcaster for airing comedian George Carlin's infamous "Filthy Words" monologue); Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15, 20 (1973) (relying on the Chaplinsky passage to define limits of
constitutionally unprotected obscenity); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (relying on
Yet Chaplinsky is also often cited in opinions expanding constitutional
protection for freedom of speech. 12 In such cases, Chaplinsky is used as a
shield instead of a sword. The citation is usually made to underscore the
point that while there are certain "well-defined and narrowly limited" classes
of speech that receive no constitutional protection, these classes are indeed
narrow and limited. Such citations thus serve the purpose of advancing the
argument that speech may be limited "this much but no more," so that
Chaplinsky, while nodded at respectfully, is simultaneously cabined and
confined. 13
And finally, Chaplinksy is often cited in judicial opinions in a more
neutral or balanced sense, to at once acknowledge pockets of unprotected
expression and draw lines demarcating the boundaries of those pockets. ' 4
II. WORDS WHICH BY THEIR VERY UTTERANCE INFLICT INJURY
A. A Grammatical Ambiguity
In parsing carefully Chaplinsky's famous passage, a grammatical
ambiguity ought to first be conceded. While listing various categories of
speech that have traditionally been thought punishable without triggering
the Chaplinsky passage to hold that obscene speech is not protected by the First Amendment);
Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 257 (1952) (invoking Chaplinksy to uphold an Illinois
"criminal libel" law and sustaining a conviction for engaging in racist hate speech).
12. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992) (analyzing the limits of
Chaplinsky in striking down an ordinance prohibiting hate speech as impermissible viewpoint and
content discrimination); United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 315 (1990) (citing Chaplinsky
while refusing to extend categories of unprotected speech to include flag desecration); Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 409 (1989) (limiting scope of Chaplinsky in overturning a conviction for flag
burning); Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (citing Chaplinsky as permitting
proscription of fighting words while refusing to uphold tort liability for infliction of emotional
distress arising from a pornographic parody of Reverend Jerry Falwell by Larry Flynt and Hustler
Magazine); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) (limiting Chaplinsky's definition of
"fighting words" to face-to-face verbal challenges likely to provoke an instant breach of peace, in the
course of reversing a conviction for wearing the words "Fuck the Draft" on a jacket in a Los Angeles
courthouse corridor).
13. See supra, note 12.
14. See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion)
(analyzing and applying Chaplinsky to defend the proposition that "true threats" are outside the
bounds of constitutional protection, and stating that laws penalizing cross-burning could in certain
circumstances be constitutional, while striking down the application of a Virginia law prohibiting
cross-burning because a prima facie evidence provision of the law allowed a jury to presume an
intent to threaten from the mere act of burning a cross) (Editorial disclosure: the author of this
Article, Dean Rod Smolla, was the counsel of record on behalf of the Respondents in the case,
presenting argument opposing the constitutionality of the Virginia statute); Denver Area Educ.
Telecom. Consortium, Inc., v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 518 U.S. 727, 740 (1996) (Breyer, J.,
plurality opinion) (citing Chaplinksy in the course of sustaining in part and striking down in part
certain regulation of sexually explicit cable television programming); Bose Corp. v. Consumers
Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 504-05 (1984) (acknowledging the legitimacy of the
Chaplinsky categories but establishing the doctrine of "independent appellate review" to police the
integrity of the categories and ensure protection of free speech).
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"any constitutional problem," the Court mentions "the lewd and obscene, the
profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words."15 The end of
this list is punctuated by a dash, which is in turn followed by the intriguing
explanatory clause being explored here: "-those which by their very
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.', 6
It is highly unlikely that this sentence was ever intended to bear the hard
doctrinal weight that is sometimes ascribed to it, as if the "list" described in
Chaplinsky was meant to account for the full universe of unprotected classes
of speech. The tenor of the sentence is more off-hand and evocative. The
Court says that these words "include" the examples listed, in the open sense
of the phrase "include, for example," rather than the closed sense of "include
only."
Turning to the explanatory clause of the passage, in which the Court
speaks of words "which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite
an immediate breach of peace,"' 7 it is plain that both approaches to the
regulation of expression are being invoked, with the word "or" in the
middle. It is perhaps not entirely clear whether the Court meant to imply
that all of the examples in its list might be deemed to be either words that by
their utterance inflict injury, or words that tend to incite an immediate breach
of peace, or both.
The most sensible reading of the passage, however, is that the "lewd and
obscene," the "profane," and the "libelous" are all being cited as examples
of inherently harmful expression-these are the examples of what the Court
meant by words "which by their very utterance inflict injury." In contrast,
the "insulting" or "fighting" words in the list may be examples of what the
Court meant by expression that tends to incite an immediate breach of peace.
This is a reasonable understanding of the passage, because normally we do
not think of the "profane" or the "lewd and obscene" or the "libelous" as
causing a "breach of peace," in the normal sense of causing physical
violence or disturbance. The harm is less temporal and more spiritual, more
in the nature of injury to good morals than to good order.
B. The Inherently Dangerous Dicta
The passage from Chaplinksy that is the particular focus of this
article-the notion that there are words which by their very utterance inflict
15. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
16. Id.
17. See id. (emphasis added).
injury-was itself arguably dicta. 18 The New Hampshire statute at issue had
been given a narrowing construction by the New Hampshire Supreme Court,
one that limited its application to words that have a direct tendency to
provoke violence by the person to whom the words are addressed. '9
It was on this basis that the Court in Chaplinsky stated that it was
"unable to say that the limited scope of the statute as thus construed
contravenes the Constitutional right of free expression."2 ° The Court thus
described the law as "narrowly drawn and limited to define and punish
specific conduct lying within the domain of state power, the use in a public
place of words likely to cause a breach of the peace., 21 Similarly, the Court
was willing to acquiesce in the application of this standard to the facts of the
case, 22 claiming that "[a]rgument is unnecessary to demonstrate that the
appellations 'damned racketeer' and 'damned Fascist' are epithets likely to
provoke the average person to retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of the
peace. 23
If the phrase "words which by their very utterance inflict injury" was
technically dicta, it was, to pun the thought, "inherently dangerous dicta,"
for the notion that there may be words that are so inherently dangerous that
they may be penalized by the government without proof of more has
maintained a striking hold, and some might judge inherently dangerous hold,
on the future evolution of free speech debate in the United States.
18. See Purtell v. Mason, 527 F.3d 615, 624 (7th Cir. 2008); see also Nadine Strossen,
Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?, DUKE L.J. 484, 508-09 (1990)
(explaining that "the first prong of Chaplinsky's fighting words definition, words 'which by their
very utterance inflict injury,' was dictum"; the Court has subsequently "substantially narrowed
Chaplinsky's definition of fighting words by bringing that definition into line with Chaplinsky's
actual holding.").
19. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573 ("On the authority of its earlier decisions, the state court
declared that the statute's purpose was to preserve the public peace, no words being 'forbidden
except such as have a direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the persons to whom, individually,
the remark is addressed.' It was further said: 'The word "offensive" is not to be defined in terms of
what a particular addressee thinks. . . .The test is what men of common intelligence would
understand would be words likely to cause an average addressee to fight.... The English language
has a number of words and expressions which by general consent are "fighting words" when said
without a disarming smile.... Such words, as ordinary men know, are likely to cause a fight. So are
threatening, profane or obscene revilings. Derisive and annoying words can be taken as coming
within the purview of the statute as heretofore interpreted only when they have this characteristic of
plainly tending to excite the addressee to a breach of the peace .... The statute, as construed, does no
more than prohibit the face-to-face words plainly likely to cause a breach of the peace by the
addressee, words whose speaking constitutes a breach of the peace by the speaker-including
"classical fighting words," words in current use less "classical" but equally likely to cause violence,
and other disorderly words, including profanity, obscenity and threats."') (citing State v. Brown, 38
A. 731 (1895); State v. McConnell, 47 A. 267 (N.H. 1900)).
20. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573 (emphasis added).
21. Id. at 573 (emphasis added).
22. Id. at 574 ("Nor can we say that the application of the statute to the facts disclosed by the
record substantially or unreasonably impinges upon the privilege of free speech.").
23. Id.
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III. CHAPLINSKY'S INFLUENCE OVER TIME
I will take up the three "inherently harmful" categories of speech listed
in Chaplinksy in ascending order of ongoing vitality, ranking them according
to their continued viability in contemporary legal doctrine. I begin with the
"profane," which is now essentially largely protected speech under the First
Amendment, though there are arenas, such as public schools, public
employment, and television and radio broadcasting, where it remains, in
some circumstances, punishable.24 I will then turn to the libelous, which is
now partially protected by a matrix of complex First Amendment doctrines,
at least when the libel implicates matters of public concern. I will end with
the "lewd and the obscene," that part of Chaplinsky that continues to have
the greatest life.
With regard to all of these categories, it should be confessed at the
outset that there is some element of artificiality to the exercise. For it is
doubtful that a clean line may ever be drawn between those words that are
inherently harmful and those words that are merely potentially harmful. Put
another way, there is a bit of contrivance to the notion that some words are
unprotected by the First Amendment solely because they "by their very
utterance inflict injury," while other words are unprotected by the First
Amendment solely because they induce or incite other injury, injury that
exists in some other time, place, or space, through the intervention of other
causal agents (a bullet or a bomb) beyond the words themselves.
Thus all of the categories specifically mentioned in Chaplinsky, the
profane, libelous, obscene, and fighting words, might well be conceptualized
not simply as speech that "inflicts injury" in some instant and inherent sense,
but words that experience teaches are particularly likely to cause injury,
even though that injury cannot be easily measured or quantified. The notion
of "presumed damages" in defamation, for example, is not grounded so
much in the notion that defamatory words in themselves instantly cause
injury, as if they were verbal bullets, as in the notion that experience teaches
us that the injury exists, even though it is difficult to ascertain and
measure.
25
24. See, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986) (finding that "it is a
highly appropriate function of public school education to prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive
terms in public discourse"); 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2008) ("Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or
profane language by means of radio communication shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than two years, or both.").
25. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1983) (plurality
opinion); see infra notes 118-123 and accompanying text.
Even so, there is a rough and ready line separating legal standards that
permit criminal or civil liability to be imposed on expression only when
reasonably demanding standards requiring proof of harm, or close
connection to potential harm, are satisfied, and legal standards that dispense
with such requirements. Those that dispense with such proof, the categories
identified in Chaplinsky, have always been fascinating objects for study. A
central ongoing concern of that study is the extent to which the principled
application of First Amendment doctrine should or should not acknowledge
their ongoing vitality.
A. The Profane
1. The Two Meanings of Profanity
What is "profane" speech? As a legal term, the word has multiple
meanings. A number of its meanings relate to religion, to the sacred, and to
God. There are several variant strains of this form of profanity, but they
share, as a common linkage, some debasing or degrading or perverse
invocation of the holy or divine. The crime of "profanity" in this
spiritualistic sense is closely associated with the crimes of "blasphemy" and
"sacrilege." The term "profanity" also has a secular meaning, referring
simply to vulgar language, ordinary "cussing" or "swearing," which may
have no religious meaning whatsoever. Blasphemous profanity is a subset
of the broader secularized concept of profanity. All blasphemy is profanity,
but not all profanity is blasphemy.26
2. Profanity and the Sacred
The overlap of profanity and blasphemy dates back to early colonial
laws. The Massachusetts Bay Colony, for example, punished "composing,
writing, printing or publishing.., any filthy, obscene, or profane song,
pamphlet, libel or mock sermon, in imitation or in mimicking of preaching,
or any other part of divine worship." 2  Typical of the religious strain of
profanity in more modem times is a Michigan law, considered in a 2007
case by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,28 which
defined the crime of "cursing and swearing" in the biblical parlance of
taking the name of God in vain, declaring one guilty of a misdemeanor "who
shall profanely curse or damn or swear by the name of God, Jesus Christ or
the Holy Ghost. . '... 29 The Ninth Circuit, in a 1931 decision, defined the
26. See Oney v. Oklahoma City, 120 F.2d 861, 865 n.12 (10th Cir. 1941).
27. Province of Mass. Bay, c. CV, § 8 (1712), in Mass. Bay Colony Charter & Laws 399 (1814).
28. Leonard v. Robinson, 477 F.3d 347 (6th Cir. 2007).
29. Id. at 356 (quoting MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.103 (2007)) ("CURSING AND SWEARING-
Any person who has arrived at the age of discretion, who shall profanely curse or damn or swear by
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"profane" in similarly ecclesiastical terms, as "[i]rreverent toward God or
holy things; speaking or spoken, acting or acted, in manifest or implied
contempt of sacred things; blasphemous; as, profane language; profane
swearing. ' 3
Some decisions narrowed the compass of such profanity to imprecations
of divine vengeance, so that "cursing" became more literally to impose a
true curse, a spiritual condemnation, a calling forth of the power of the
divine to damn the victim at whom the curse was targeted. As an Alabama
decision thus explained in 1970, to say "God damn it" was not criminal, but
to say "God damn you" was.
31
The crime of profanity has thus always been closely connected to
religious notions of sin. From colonial to modem times, in legislative
enactments and judicial interpretations, the profane has been defined as an
offense against the sacred.
If profanity and blasphemy were often essentially treated as
synonymous, however, the concept of profanity did not remain exclusively
cabined to words that insulted the divine or invoked divine vengeance. A
second strain of profanity also developed, a broader strain not exclusively
limited to expression that was in some sense also blasphemous. This
secularized version of profanity perhaps reflected an incipient American
judicial intuition that blasphemy should be the business of ecclesiastical
tribunals, and profanity the business of secular courts. Under this view the
rationale for punishing profanity morphed from punishment for sins against
the divine to protection of societal interests in maintaining public morality
and peace. 32
the name of God, Jesus Christ or the Holy Ghost, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. No such
prosecution shall be sustained unless it shall be commenced within 5 days after the commission of
such offense.").
30. Duncan v. United States, 48 F.2d 128, 133 (9th Cir. 1931).
31. Baines v. City of Birmingham, 240 So. 2d 689, 692 (Ala. Crim. App. 1970) ("[T]o constitute
profanity an accused must imprecate divine vengeance upon an individual and that while the
expression 'God damn you' is considered profanity, 'God damn it' is not. The evidence in this case
presented a question for the jury whether the defendant uttered the words 'God damn you' or 'God
damn it."'); Sanford v. State, 44 So. 801 (Miss. 1907) (holding that the statement "Go to hell, you
low-down devils," did not violate the statute) ("The language does not violate the statute, since, upon
strict construction, which is required of the courts, it lacks any 'imprecation of divine vengeance'
and does not 'imply divine condemnation.' There was simply a rude request or order to go to hell,
with no necessity to obey, no power to enforce obedience, and no intimation that the irresistible
Power had condemned, or was invoked to condemn, them to go to hell.") (citations omitted).
32. See Oney v. Oklahoma City, 120 F.2d 861, 865 n.12 (10th Cir. 1941) ("While the
ecclesiastical courts punished blasphemy as an offense against God, it was not so viewed by the
temporal courts. The latter regarded it as injurious to the essential interests of society, or as tending
directly to a breach of the peace, and in the latter sense it was punishable at common law.").
Whether "profanity" is conceived in its religious or its temporal sense,
or some amalgam of both, to what extent may it still be punished in
American law, consistent with the First Amendment? All attempts to punish
profanity as a spiritual crime-that is to say, all attempts to punish that
strain of profanity that is conterminous with blasphemy--ought now be
regarded as blocked by settled understandings of the Religion Clauses.
Secular government cannot assume jurisdiction to punish the desecration of
the divine through blasphemous words alone without engaging in either an
unconstitutional establishment of religion or an unconstitutional burdening
of its free exercise, or in some circumstances, both.
The seminal statement of this principle in the Supreme Court came in
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson.33 The case involved an attempt by the State
of New York to block the exhibition of a motion picture, "The Miracle," on
grounds that it was "sacrilegious. 34  The New York Court of Appeals
interpreted "sacrilegious" as a kind of prohibition on religious libel, insult,
or hate speech, explaining that the meaning of the statutory provision was
simply "that no religion, as that word is understood by the ordinary,
reasonable person, shall be treated with contempt, mockery, scorn and
ridicule. '35 The Supreme Court struck down the regime, emphasizing that
the scheme was a system of prior restraint vesting arbitrary and subjective
discretion in New York's censors.36 The decision, however, was also
grounded solidly in the Court's objection to the state presuming to referee
among competing religious views, and the concomitant danger that the
power of the state would be co-opted by vocal and powerful religious
orthodoxies:
In seeking to apply the broad and all-inclusive definition of
"sacrilegious" given by the New York courts, the censor is set adrift
upon a boundless sea amid a myriad of conflicting currents of
religious views, with no charts but those provided by the most vocal
and powerful orthodoxies. New York cannot vest such unlimited
restraining control over motion pictures in a censor. Under such a
standard the most careful and tolerant censor would find it virtually
33. 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
34. Id. at 497, n.l (quoting N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 129 (McKinney 1947)). ("The director of the
[motion picture] division [of the education department] or, when authorized by the regents, the
officers of a local office or bureau shall cause to be promptly examined every motion picture film
submitted to them as herein required, and unless such film or a part thereof is obscene, indecent,
immoral, inhuman, sacrilegious, or is of such a character that its exhibition would tend to corrupt
morals or incite to crime, shall issue a license therefor. If such director or, when so authorized, such
officer shall not license any film submitted, he shall furnish to the applicant therefor a written report
of the reasons for his refusal and a description of each rejected part of a film not rejected in toto.").
35. Joseph Burstyn, 343 U.S. at 504.
36. Id. at 504-05.
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impossible to avoid favoring one religion over another, and he
would be subject to an inevitable tendency to ban the expression of
unpopular sentiments sacred to a religious minority. Application of
the "sacrilegious" test, in these or other respects, might raise
substantial questions under the First Amendment's guaranty of
separate church and state with freedom of worship for all.
However, from the standpoint of freedom of speech and the press, it
is enough to point out that the state has no legitimate interest in
protecting any or all religions from views distasteful to them which
is sufficient to justify prior restraints upon the expression of those
views. It is not the business of government in our nation to
suppress real or imagined attacks upon a particular religious
doctrine, whether they appear in publications, speeches, or motion
pictures.3 7
Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justices Jackson and Burton, wrote a
concurring opinion in Joseph Burstyn. Justice Frankfurter's decision in
Joseph Burstyn is of special note because he was the author of the Supreme
Court's decision in Beauharnais v. Illinois,35 decided the same year as
Joseph Burstyn. In Beauharnais, a unanimous decision, the Court upheld an
Illinois "criminal libel" statute, a law we would now describe as "hate
speech" legislation, which made criminal the utterance of attacks on racial
and ethnic groups. 39 One might well have treated the New York law in
context in Joseph Burstyn as a simple variant of the law upheld in Illinois, a
"religious criminal libel" or "religious hate speech" law instead of a racial
libel or hate speech law. Justice Frankfurter, however, saw a fundamental
constitutional difference between an attack on a racial group and an attack
on religious doctrine. Justice Frankfurter seemed to concede that attacks on
religious dogma might by their very utterance inflict injury on the faithful
who religiously believe in the doctrine being attacked, but redress for this
sort of injury was not legally cognizable. 40 "To criticize or assail religious
doctrine may wound to the quick those who are attached to the doctrine and
profoundly cherish it,"'4 1 Justice Frankfurter thus conceded. "But to bar such
pictorial discussion is to subject non-conformists to the rule of sects. 42
37. Id. (citation omitted).
38. 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
39. See infra notes 92-106 and accompanying text.
40. Joseph Burstyn, 343 U.S. at 519 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
41. Id. (emphasis added).
42. Id.
In Beauharnais, Justice Frankfurter would ground the Court's defense
of the Illinois race-hate law largely on the theory that race hate may lead to
race wars. Yet human experience teaches every bit as powerfully that
religious hate may lead to religious wars. Is there any principled difference?
If there is, it may rest heavily in the supposition that religious "sacrilege" or
"profanity" or "blasphemy" laws are always and inevitably laws that target
attacks on beliefs and ideas. In theory it might be possible to distinguish
attacks on Catholicism from attacks on Catholics, attacks on Judaism from
attacks on Jews, attacks on Islam from attacks on Muslims. Justice
Frankfurter's opinion in Joseph Burstyn is best explained in these terms, if
one seeks to make sense of it in light of his historically contemporaneous
opinion in Beauharnais. Justice Frankfurter in Joseph Burstyn thus delved
deeply into the etymology of the word "sacrilege," explaining that
"sacrilege" was originally limited to the stealing or desecration of physical
objects or physical places that were sacred, coming from the roots "sacer"
(sacred) and "legere" (to steal or pick out). 43 But as early as the time of
Cicero, the meaning of the word in popular speech broadened to include any
injury or insult to sacred things (as in primitive societies it would be related
to the notion of "tabu"), and the term became broadly associated with attacks
on the sacred or holy, including dogma and belief as well as physical
objects. 4  While Catholic theologians such as Saint Thomas Aquinas
adhered to technical distinctions between "sacrilege" as attacks on holy
things and "apostasy," "heresy," and "blasphemy" as attacks on religious
dogma, and while dictionaries might continue the distinction, 45 neither
popular speech nor the sacrilege law of New York had maintained such
disciplined usage. Justice Frankfurter thus concluded "that the limits of this
definition remain too uncertain to justify constraining the creative efforts of
the imagination by fear of pains and penalties imposed by a necessarily
subjective censorship. '46
The decision in Joseph Burstyn has been reinforced by the proliferation
of cases decided under the Religion Clauses that define the division of
jurisdiction between ecclesiastical and religious courts, disqualifying secular
courts from adjudicating matters of religious dogma. As the Supreme Court
explained in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of
Oregon v. Smith,47 "[r]epeatedly and in many different contexts, we have
warned that courts must not presume to determine the place of a particular
belief in a religion or the plausibility of a religious claim.""48 Indeed the
43. Id. at 520.
44. Id. at 521.
45. Id. at 521-22 (citing ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, part II-I, question 99).
46. Id. at 525.
47. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
48. Id. at 887.
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recognition of this principle in Supreme Court cases can be traced back long
before Joseph Burstyn, and long before the evolution of contemporary First
Amendment doctrine. In 1872, the Supreme Court decided Watson v.
Jones,4 9 which posed an oft-recurring question in church disputes: who owns
the church after a schism in which the members of the church divide into
two distinct bodies?5° When such a dispute arises, ecclesiastical tribunals
will often be the first to rule on the question. In Watson, the Court held:
[W]henever the questions of discipline or of faith, or ecclesiastical
rule, custom, or law have been decided by the highest of these
church judicatories to which the matter has been carried, the legal
tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and as binding on
them, in their application to the case before them.51
The principles announced in Watson presaged First Amendment
developments, and have now been absorbed into constitutional law as
orthodox Establishment and Free Exercise Clause doctrine. As Watson
elegantly explained, "[t]he law knows no heresy, and is committed to the
support of no dogma, the establishment of no sect."52
Echoes of this principle may now be heard in the "ecclesiastical
abstention" cases, decisions that invoke a kind of "spiritual federalism"
principle in which authority over religious controversies are reserved for
religious courts.53 As encapsulated in Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v.
Milivojevich: 5
4
[W]here resolution of the disputes cannot be made without
extensive inquiry by civil courts into religious law and polity, the
First and Fourteenth Amendments mandate that civil courts shall
not disturb the decisions of the highest ecclesiastical tribunal within
49. 80 U.S. 679 (1871).
50. See generally id. Watson was a diversity case decided prior to the incorporation of the First
Amendment against the states, and decided prior to Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938). The Court in Watson thus used as its rule of decision "general federal law." Id.
51. Id. at 727.
52. Id. at 728.
53. These cases attempt to navigate a line dividing the application of neutral principles of secular
law to the adjudication of disputes over issues such as the property ownership of a church, and
inquiry into religious theology and doctrine. See, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979); The Md.
& Va. Eldership of the Churches of God v. The Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367
(1970); Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440
(1969); Kedroffv. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
54. 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
a church of hierarchical polity, but must accept such decisions as
binding on them, in their application to the religious issues of
doctrine or polity before them.55
Applying these various lines of precedent and principle, it is safe to
declare dead that small piece of Chaplinsky suggesting that the banning of
religious "profanity" would pose no constitutional problem.5 6  To the
contrary, a law banning "profane speech" in overtly religious terms is
squarely in conflict with modem Religion Clause jurisprudence. Even
efforts by states to recast profanity laws originally written in religious
vocabulary as secularized, attempting to transform the laws into mere
"incitement" or "breach of peace" prohibitions, will not be defensible so
long as the statute remains overtly religious.
5 7
3. Secular Profanity
If the Religion Clauses have rendered obsolete the criminalizing of
religious profanity, has the Speech Clause likewise rendered obsolete the
criminalizing of secular profanity? Does modem Speech Clause doctrine
permit the government to ban profanity on the theory that the utterance of
the words alone, without more, may be penalized? For the most part, the
answer is "no." While the government may, if it satisfies rigorous modem
55. Id. at 709 (citing The Md. & Va. Eldership of the Churches of God, 396 U.S. at 369
(Brennan, J., concurring)).
56. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942).
57. In State v. West, 263 A.2d 602, 603 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1970), for example, a Maryland
court struck down a Maryland statute that read:
If any person, by writing or speaking, shall blaspheme or curse God, or shall write or
utter any profane words of and concerning our Saviour Jesus Christ, or of and concerning
the Trinity, or any of the persons thereof, he shall on conviction be fined not more than
one hundred dollars, or imprisoned not more than six months, or both fined and
imprisoned as aforesaid, at the discretion of the court.
Id. at 603 (quoting MD. CODE ANN., art. 27, § 20). The court traced the history of the law to
a 1649 enactment of the Colonial legislature entitled "An Act Concerning Religion"
which provided for punishment "with Death, and Conviscation of Lands and Goods to the
Lord Proprietary" of anyone found guilty of committing "Blasphemy against GOD, or
denying the Holy TRINITY, or the Godhead of any of the Three Persons."
Id. The court rejected an attempt by Maryland to imbue the law with a "secular aura." Id. The law,
the court insisted, "plainly and unequivocally makes it a crime for any person to blaspheme or curse
God, whether orally or in writing, or to 'write or utter profane words of and concerning our Saviour
Jesus Christ, or of and concerning the Trinity,"' and moreover, "simply and categorically proscribes
such utterances under any and all circumstances." Id. at 605. On these terms, the court held, the law
was flatly unconstitutional. Id. ("Patently, the statute was intended to protect and preserve and
perpetuate the Christian religion in this State. It obviously was intended to serve and, if allowed to
stand, would continue to serve as a mantle of protection by the State to believers in Christian
orthodoxy and extend to those individuals the aid, comfort and support of the State. This effort by
the State of Maryland to extend its protective cloak to the Christian religion or to any other religion
is forbidden by the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment.").
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doctrinal limitations, proscribe incitement to violence, fighting words that
threaten an immediate breach of peace, or true threats, it may not penalize
the mere utterance of profanity.58
Cohen v. California5 9 is the most significant precedent. Paul Cohen
wore a jacket in the corridor of a Los Angeles courthouse, with women and
children present, bearing the phrase "Fuck the Draft. ' ' 60  In an opinion by
Justice Harlan, the Supreme Court rejected California's claim that it could
use the law to preserve decency and decorum in society by banning public
vulgarity and sheltering citizens from offensive language. 61 No longer, the
Court made clear, could vulgar words be equated with fighting words as that
phrase had been used in Chaplinsky.62 Henceforth, the Court made clear, to
qualify as "fighting words" the statements must constitute "a direct personal
insult" directed at a specific person.63
The analysis in Cohen was a direct affront to the "inherently harmful"
side of Chaplinsky. The Court thus framed the question as whether
California could excise
one particular scurrilous epithet from the public discourse, either
upon the theory of the court below that its use is inherently likely to
cause violent reaction or upon a more general assertion that the
States, acting as guardians of public morality, may properly remove
this offensive word from the public vocabulary." 64
58. See infra notes 86-88, and accompanying text.
59. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
60. Id. at 16.
61. Id. at 17.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 20. ("This Court has also held that the States are free to ban the simple use, without a
demonstration of additional justifying circumstances, of so-called 'fighting words,' those personally
abusive epithets which, when addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a matter of common
knowledge, inherently likely to provoke violent reaction. While the four-letter word displayed by
Cohen in relation to the draft is not uncommonly employed in a personally provocative fashion, in
this instance it was clearly not 'directed to the person of the hearer.' No individual actually or likely
to be present could reasonably have regarded the words on appellant's jacket as a direct personal
insult. Nor do we have here an instance of the exercise of the State's police power to prevent a
speaker from intentionally provoking a given group to hostile reaction. There is, as noted above, no
showing that anyone who saw Cohen was in fact violently aroused or that appellant intended such a
result." (citations omitted) (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309 (1940); Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951); Terminiello v.
Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, (1949)).
64. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 22-23.
The Court in Cohen rejected both theories. 65 California could not define
in advance certain words and declare them inherently likely to provoke a
breach of peace; nor could California "cleanse public debate to the point
where it is grammatically palatable to the most squeamish among us." '66 The
Court could identify no limiting principle to this proposition, for in Justice
Harlan's famous quip, "[O]ne man's vulgarity is another's lyric. ' 67 Most
importantly, however, Justice Harlan's analysis in Cohen, like Justice
Frankfurter's in Joseph Burstyn, perceived that permission to censor
unsavory words ran perilously close to permission to censor unpopular
thoughts.68 On this basic matter of principle, Cohen truly turned Chaplinsky
on its head. For while Chaplinsky approved of the use of banning certain
inherently harmful words precisely because their perceived social benefit
was low, Cohen reversed the computation, stating that the Court could
perceive little social benefit to running the risk that suppression of words
might be a surrogate for the suppression of ideas.69
Before it can be confidently declared that Chaplinksy's approval of laws
banning the "profane" is no longer good law, however, several exceptions
and complications must be dealt with. In at least three significant arenas,
First Amendment doctrine does not bar the government from penalizing
profane speech. Public schools may discipline students for using profanity
in school.70 Public employers may, in some circumstances, discipline
employees for using profanity on the job.71  And the Federal
Communications Commission may discipline broadcasters for broadcasting
profanity on radio and television.72
4. Profanity in Schools
In Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 71 the Supreme Court held that
the First Amendment protected a public school student's wearing of a black
armband as a symbol of anti-war protest, announcing that students in public
schools do not "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
65. Id. at 23.
66. Id. at 25.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 26 ("Finally, and in the same vein, we cannot indulge the facile assumption that one
can forbid particular words without also running a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the
process. Indeed, governments might soon seize upon the censorship of particular words as a
convenient guise for banning the expression of unpopular views.").
69. Id. ("We have been able, as noted above, to discern little social benefit that might result from
running the risk of opening the door to such grave results.").
70. See infra Part III.A.4-5.
71. See infra Part III.A.6.
72. See infra Part III.A.7.
73. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
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expression at the schoolhouse gate."74  Students do, however, shed their
rights to use profanity.
In Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,75 Matthew Fraser, a 14-
year-old public high school student, delivered a "campaign speech" on
behalf of a fellow student, in a school assembly. The speech was filled with
sexual metaphors and innuendos.76  For this ribald oratory, Fraser was
suspended by the school principal, under the authority of a school rule
declaring that "[c]onduct which materially and substantially interferes with
the educational process is prohibited, including the use of obscene, profane
language or gestures. 77  Chief Justice Burger wrote the opinion of the
Court, holding that Fraser's speech was not protected by the First
Amendment." The Court emphasized that the First Amendment "rights of
students in public school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of
adults in other settings. 79  In a passage that seemed to dilute the test
articulated in Tinker, the Court stated that a school need not tolerate student
speech that is inconsistent with its "basic educational mission.
80
Describing Fraser's speech as "plainly offensive to both teachers and
students," and as "acutely insulting to teenage girl students," the Court
observed that the language "could well be seriously damaging to its less
mature audience, many of whom were only 14 years old and on the
threshold of awareness of human sexuality."'" While the black armbands in
Tinker were a form of nondisruptive, passive expression, the Court reasoned,
the sexual content of the speech given by Fraser was not.82 In a critical and
entirely sensible distinction, the Court drew the line between the rights of
students within schools and classrooms to espouse unpopular views, and the
quite different problem of curbing socially unacceptable behavior. 83 It is
one thing for the teacher or principal to punish the student merely because of
disagreement with the intellectual or ideological content of a message, and
74. Id. at 506.
75. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
76. Fraser touted his candidate as "a man who is firm-he's firm in his pants, he's firm in his
shirt, his character is firm-but most ... of all, his belief in you, the students of Bethel, is firm."
Fraser also praised his candidate as "a man who takes his point and pounds it in.... a man who will
go to the very end--even the climax, for each and every one of you." Id. at 687 (Brennan, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
77. Id. at 678.
78. See id. at 685.
79. Id. at 682.
80. Id. at 685.
81. Id. at 683.
82. See id. at 680.
83. Id. at 681.
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quite another to punish the student for vulgarity, sexual innuendo, or other
"juvenile" behavior having nothing serious to do with any intellectual or
ideological viewpoint. "The undoubted freedom to advocate unpopular and
controversial views in schools and classrooms," the Court thus explained,
"must be balanced against the society's countervailing interest in teaching
students the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior., 8 4  The Court
quoted the passage from Chaplinsky regarding order and morality, 85 and
held that the school district was entirely within its authority "to make the
point to the pupils that vulgar speech and lewd conduct is wholly
inconsistent with the 'fundamental values' of public school education. 86
"'[T]he First Amendment gives a high school student the classroom right to
wear Tinker's armband, but not Cohen's jacket."' 87
More recently, in Morse v. Frederick,88 the Supreme Court held that
school officials did not violate the First Amendment in disciplining a high
school student who unfurled a banner during an event to commemorate the
passing of the Olympic Torch relay through Juneau, Alaska, displaying the
message: "BONG HiTS 4 JESUS." 89  While this message may not have
qualified as "profanity" in the strict sense, and while it would undoubtedly
have been fully protected by the First Amendment if the student had
displayed the banner in a public forum on the streets, sidewalks, or parks of
Juneau outside of school-sponsored activities, the Court in Morse, in an
opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, held that school officials could discipline
the student for displaying the message during a school sponsored event. 90
The school principal could reasonably have interpreted the message as
advocating illegal drug use, the Court reasoned, and this was enough to
justify the school's action. 91
5. Profanity in Public Universities
The principles established in decisions such as Bethel, Morse, and
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,92 which sustained the power of
public school officials to control the content of high school newspapers, are
84. Id.
85. Id. at 685 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
86. Bethel, 478 U.S. at 685-86.
87. Id. at 682 (quoting Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1057
(2d Cir. 1979) (Newman, J., concurring).
88. 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007). The school principal and school district were represented in the
Supreme Court by Kenneth Starr, Duane and Kelly Roberts Dean and Professor of Law, Pepperdine
University.
89. Id. at 2622, 2629.
90. Id. at 2629.
91. Id.at2625.
92. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
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not necessarily limited to elementary and secondary schools. In Brown v.
Li,93 a graduate student at the University of California at Santa
Barbara, Christopher Brown, had his scientific thesis approved on its
academic merits by his thesis committee. 94 After obtaining the approval
signatures, he added an "Acknowledgments" section, which he labeled as
"Disacknowledgements," and which began: "I would like to offer special
Fuck You's to the following degenerates for of [sic] being an ever-present
hindrance during my graduate career." 95  Brown then identified the Dean
and staff of the graduate school, the managers of the library, the former
California Governor, Pete Wilson, the Regents of the University of
California, and "Science" in general as having been particularly obstructive
to his progress toward his graduate degree. 96 Brown later explained that he
had not revealed the section to the members of his committee because he
feared that they would not approve it. 97 The University, finding out about
the "Disacknowledgement," failed Brown. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the University's action did not violate
the First Amendment, holding that college and university educators may
restrict student speech in curricular matters, "provided. . . the limitation is
reasonably related to a legitimate pedagogical purpose."98 The court relied
heavily on Hazelwood, and a decision of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit in Settle v. Dickson County School Board,99 for the
proposition that:
"the bottom line is that when a teacher makes an assignment, even if
she does it poorly, the student has no constitutional right to do
something other than that assignment and receive credit for it. It is
not necessary to try to cram this situation into the framework of
constitutional precedent, because there is no constitutional
question." 00
The decision of the Sixth Circuit in Settle quite eloquently explained
why the very nature of teaching requires content-based judgments by
93. 308 F.3d 939 (9th Cir. 2002).
94. Id. at 942-43.
95. Id. at 943.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 944.
98. Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 939, 947 (9th Cir. 2002).
99. 53 F.3d 152 (6th Cir. 1995).
100. Brown, 308 F.3d at 949 (quoting Settle, 53 F.3d at 158 (Batchhelder, J. concurring)).
teachers, in much the same sense that the very nature of judging requires
content-based judgments by judges:
Where learning is the focus, as in the classroom, student speech
may be even more circumscribed than in the school newspaper or
other open forum. So long as the teacher limits speech or grades
speech in the classroom in the name of learning and not as a pretext
for punishing the student for her race, gender, economic class,
religion or political persuasion, the federal courts should not
interfere.
Like judges, teachers should not punish or reward people on the
basis of inadmissible factors-race, religion, gender, political
ideology-but teachers, like judges, must daily decide which
arguments are relevant, which computations are correct, which
analogies are good or bad, and when it is time to stop writing or
talking. Grades must be given by teachers in the classroom, just as
cases are decided in the courtroom; and to this end teachers, like
judges, must direct the content of speech. Teachers may frequently
make mistakes in grading and otherwise, just as we do sometimes in
deciding cases, but it is the essence of the teacher's responsibility in
the classroom to draw lines and make distinctions-in a word to
encourage speech germane to the topic at hand and discourage
speech unlikely to shed light on the subject. Teachers therefore
must be given broad discretion to give grades and conduct class
discussion based on the content of speech .... It is not for us to
overrule the teacher's view that the student should learn to write
research papers by beginning with a topic other than her own
theology.'01
The Ninth Circuit conceded that there was no clear precedent from the
Supreme Court as to whether the deferential Hazelwood or Settle standards
ought to apply at the university level in the same manner that they do in a
primary-school or secondary-school environment.'0 2 When dealing with the
speech of college and university students outside of curricular and
university-sponsored speech, even including such contexts as yearbooks and
newspapers, the court suggested the lax Hazelwood approach ought not
apply. 103
But academic work, the court held, was different: "The Supreme Court
has suggested that core curricular speech-that which is an integral part of
101. Settle, 53 F.3dat 155-56.
102. Brown, 308 F.3d at 939.
103. Id.
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the classroom-teaching function of an educational institution--differs from
students' extracurricular speech and that a public educational institution
retains discretion to prescribe its curriculum."'04
The court in Brown engaged in illuminating explorations of the extent to
which even "viewpoint" judgments in an academic setting may be somewhat
insulated from First Amendment challenge by students.'0 5 Educational
assignments, often by their nature, involve a certain form of viewpoint
discrimination. Schools may not force a student to believe a particular
viewpoint, or even to profess it, but they may at times, as an appropriate
academic exercise, require a student to recite it. 106 As the court in Brown v.
Li recognized, "a teacher may require a student to write a paper from a
particular viewpoint, even if it is a viewpoint with which the student
disagrees, so long as the requirement serves a legitimate pedagogical
purpose."' 10 7 For example, "a college history teacher may demand a paper
defending Prohibition, and a law-school professor may assign students to
write 'opinions' showing how Justices Ginsburg and Scalia would analyze a
particular Fourth Amendment question."' 08
Applying these principles, the court held that it was within the academic
purview of the University to determine that Brown's profanity was a
sufficiently serious departure from academic norms to warrant the punitive
action. 109
6. Profanity in Government Employment
The body of First Amendment law addressing the free speech rights of
government employees is largely defined by the Supreme Court's decisions
in Connick v. Meyers" and Pickering v. Board of Education."' The
standard emanating from these cases employs a balancing test to weigh the
free speech rights of public employees against the workplace needs of public
employers in efficiently managing the workplace to carry on the public's
business. 12 The Connick/Pickering standard has evolved into a two-step
104. Id. at 950.
105. Id. at 939.
106. Id. at 953.
107. Brown, 308 F.3d 939, 953.
108. Id. at 953.
109. Id. at 950-53.
110. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
111. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
112. Connick, 461 U.S. at 150-55; Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
inquiry. "3 When a public employee complains that he or she has been
disciplined or discharged in retaliation for the exercise of free speech rights,
a court must first ask whether the employee was speaking "as a citizen" on
"a matter of public concern."' 1 4 If the answer is "no," the employee loses
the case. 5 If the answer is "yes," the court proceeds to part two of the test,
in which it weighs the rights of the employee against the government's
justification for limiting the speech. 16 The focus under part two of the test
tends to be whether the particular government agency is able to demonstrate
that the speech at issue in some palpable sense disrupts or interferes with the
agency's functions. 7
In 2006, the Court in Garcetti v. Ceballos"8 further curtailed the free
speech rights of government employees by narrowing the scope of prong one
of the Connick/Pickering test. The Court in Garcetti held that in
determining whether the speech at issue is speech "as a citizen on...
matter[s] of public concern," the critical inquiry is whether the speech of a
government employee is speech required by the employee's job-speech
that falls within the official duties of the employee as part of the job
description for the position the employee occupies. "9 If it is, the Court held
the employee will be deemed to be speaking "as an employee" and not "as a
citizen," and will be deemed subject to the rules and restrictions established
by the government in its capacity as an employer.
It is clear that among the rules governmental supervisors may impose is
a rule against profanity. As explained in Waters v. Churchill,120 the
principle protecting profanity established in Cohen does not preclude a
public employer from forbidding its employees from engaging in profane
speech in the public workplace. In the words of Justice O'Connor in Waters,
"[W]e have never expressed doubt that a government employer may bar its
employees from using Mr. Cohen's offensive utterance to members of the
public or to the people with whom they work."' 12' The government, in short,
may prohibit its employees from using profanity or abusive language in the
workplace, much as any employer. 122 At the same time, however, when the
113. Connick, 461 U.S. at 150-55; Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
114. Connick, 461 U.S. at 150-55; Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
115. Connick, 461 U.S. at 150-55; Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
116. Connick, 461 U.S. at 150-55; Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
117. Connick, 461 U.S. at 150-55; Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
118. 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
119. /d. at 422-24.
120. 511 U.S. 661 (1994).
121. Id. at 672 (plurality opinion).
122. See Martin v. Parrish, 805 F.2d 583, 585 (5th Cir. 1986) (a college instructor's habitual
classroom use of profanity was held not to be speech on a matter of public concern); Dambrot v.
Cent. Mich. Univ., 839 F. Supp. 477, 488 (E.D. Mich. 1993) (university basketball coach's use of a
racial epithet during a team pep talk not protected by First Amendment). In Title VII employment
discrimination law, employees may claim that they are victims of discrimination prohibited by Title
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employee is speaking on matters of public concern in settings that do not
implicate such "workplace values," government officials do not have the
freedom under the First Amendment to penalize offensive or vulgar speech
merely because of its offensive or vulgar character. 1
23
7. Profanity in Broadcasting
The Supreme Court in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,24 sustained the
power of the FCC to police "indecent programming" on radio and television,
cracking down on a radio station for broadcasting comedian George Carlin's
"Filthy Words" routine. Although the offended listener in Pacifica was not
in his home at the time of the broadcast, but riding in his car with his son,
the Supreme Court placed significant weight on the fact that radio broadcasts
permeate the home. 125 "Patently offensive, indecent material presented over
the airwaves confronts the citizen," Justice Stevens observed for the Court,
"not only in public, but also in the privacy of the home, where the
individual's right to be left alone plainly outweighs the First Amendment
rights of an intruder."'' 16  While the FCC in recent years has shown some
VII when harassment, such as racial or gender harassment, reaches a level of sufficient intensity to
be deemed a "hostile environment." See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc. 510 U.S. 17 (1993). Courts
have generally held that verbal expression in the workplace, such as sexual innuendo or racist insult,
if sufficiently intense and prolonged to meet the "hostile environment" standard, constitutes a form
of palpable employment discrimination, or "conduct," sufficient to satisfy First Amendment
standards. See Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 824 F. Supp. 847, 884 (D. Minn. 1993) ("Title VII
may legitimately proscribe conduct, including undirected expressions of gender intolerance, which
create an offensive working environment. That expression is 'swept up' in this proscription does not
violate First Amendment principles."). This dividing line in Title VII roughly parallels the line
between protected and unprotected speech in the government employment cases, and may be seen as
a doctrinal cousin to those cases. As with the government employment cases, the rationale is that the
harm caused by offensive speech in the workplace implicates palpable interests over and above the
mere capacity of the speech to cause offense, by interfering with operation of the workplace in a
direct and concrete sense.
123. Duke v. N. Tex. State Univ., 338 F. Supp. 990, 997 (E.D. Tex. 1971) (The court held that
vulgar language used by a faculty member at a public rally on the campus was not grounds for
discipline: "The University has approached this matter as if plaintiff, by the mere incantation of the
words 'fucks over,' could taint her listeners and the University in some manner, thereby justifying
exorcism of this idiom and its user from the environs of the University. Words in and of themselves
are not possessed of mystical and magical qualities. Words are to be judged solely by their
communicative value, which, in turn, is gauged by the emotive and cognitive content with which the
words are capable of being filled. That the use of one word in lieu of another may conform more
closely to canons of good taste does not justify severe sanctions against those who use the offending
word. To prohibit particular words substantially increases the risk that ideas will also be suppressed
in the process.").
124. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
125. Id. at 748.
126. Id. (citing Rowan v. U.S. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970)).
willingness to loosen regulation of the economic aspects of broadcast
regulation, it has not loosened its grip over "indecent programming." '127 The
FCC has come down hard on "shock jocks" such as Howard Stem for use of
vulgar and indecent language. 128 Most famously, the FCC took a dim view
of the Jackson Super Bowl XXXVIII halftime show "nipplegate"
controversy, in which Janet Jackson's bare breast was exposed by Justin
Timberlake in a "wardrobe malfunction." 129  Relying on the powers the
Supreme Court had granted it in cases such as Pacifica, the FCC levied a
record $550,000 fine on CBS, for the few seconds in which such "indecent
programming" was sent to millions of viewers, before CBS could cut to
aerial view of the football stadium. 130 In July 2008, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit overturned the FCC fine arising from
"nipplegate," holding that the FCC acted "arbitrarily and capriciously" in
changing its policy, which had previously excused broadcasters from the
"fleeting" broadcast of indecent material. 13 1 The Third Circuit's opinion,
however, did not question the ongoing permissibility, as a matter of First
Amendment law, of the FCC's strict enforcement of its indecency standards
under Pacifica. 13 2
B. The Libelous
In Beauharnais v. Illinois,'33 decided in 1952, the Supreme Court
reviewed a criminal conviction arising from the violation of an Illinois
"criminal libel" statute that made it a crime to portray "depravity,
criminality, unchastity, or lack of virtue of a class of citizens, of any race,
color, creed or religion" which exposed them "to contempt, derision, or
obloquy or which is productive of breach of the peace or riots."' 134 The
defendant, Beauhamais, was president of a racist Chicago organization, the
White Circle League. 135  Beauharnais and his group passed out leaflets
calling on Chicago's Mayor and City Council "to halt the further
encroachment, harassment and invasion of white people, their property,
127. See Geoffrey Rosenblat, Stern Penalties: How the Federal Communications Commission and
Congress Look to Crackdown on Indecent Broadcasting, 13 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 167 (2006)
(discussing the FCC's response to increased incidents of broadcasted indecent material).
128. See id. at 188-93 (discussing the FCC's actions against Howard Stem).
129. See CBS Corp. v. FCC, 535 F.3d 167, 172 (3d Cir. 2008) (describing events during the
halftime show).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. 343 U.S. 250(1952).
134. Id. at 251.
135, Id. at 252.
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neighborhoods and persons, by the Negro."' 3 6 The White Circle League's
racist diatribe exhorted "[o]ne million self respecting white people in
Chicago to unite," proclaiming: "If persuasion and the need to prevent the
white race from becoming mongrelized by the [N]egro will not unite us, then
the aggressions,... rapes, robberies, knives, guns and marijuana of the
[N]egro, surely will."' 37
These leaflets were vicious and evil, to be sure, but could the state of
Illinois send someone to jail for them? Beauhamais, in his defense, argued
that the First Amendment protected him and his leafleting, and asked that the
jury be instructed that he could not be found guilty unless the leaflets were
"likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil
that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance or unrest."'' 38 The
Illinois court refused to use this "clear and present danger" instruction, and
Beauhamais was convicted. 3 9 In an opinion written by Justice Frankfurter,
the United States Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. 140 The opinion of
Justice Frankfurter in Beauharnais tracked the reasoning of Chaplinsky, and
along with the obscenity decision five years later in Roth v. United States,
141
is a high-water mark of Chaplinsky's influence on First Amendment law.
Beauharnais was decided before the term "hate speech" entered our
mass lexicon. Back in 1952 the type of law Illinois had enacted was usually
known as "group libel" or "criminal libel."' 141 Justice Frankfurter clearly
saw this libel targeting a racial or religious group as different in kind from
"libel of a political party."' 143 A sharp distinction existed, Justice Frankfurter
maintained, between restrictions on political speech and restrictions relating
to "race, color, creed or religion."' 144 These terms, he insisted, had "attained
too fixed a meaning to permit political groups to be brought within" their
rubric, and for Frankfurter that rubric was apparently outside the protections
of the First Amendment. 145  "Of course," he noted, "discussion cannot
be denied and the right, as well as the duty, of criticism must not
136. Idat 252-53.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 253.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 267.
141. See id.; see also Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568 (1942).
142. Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 253 ("The Illinois Supreme Court tells us that § 244a 'is a form of
criminal libel law."' (quoting People v. Beauhamais, 97 N.E.2d 343, 346 (Ill. 1951))).
143. Id. at 263.
144. Id.at263n.18.
145. Id.
be ... stifled."' 146 For Justice Frankfurter, however, there was nothing
"political" about this speech, nor did it rise to the level of worthwhile
discussion or discourse.147 "If a statute sought to outlaw libels of political
parties," he conceded, "quite different problems not now before us would be
raised." 148
Justice Frankfurter thought that hate speech was closely analogous to
civil libel-and that the force of the analogy was not dissipated merely
because the slur was aimed at an entire racial group. 149 Justice Frankfurter
observed that if a libelous utterance directed at an individual may be
punished, "we cannot deny to a State power to punish the same utterance
directed at a defined group, unless we can say that this is a willful and
purposeless restriction unrelated to the peace and well-being of the State."' 15
Justice Frankfurter made an oblique but unmistakable reference to Nazi
Germany in his opinion, noting that Illinois did not need to "await the tragic
experience of the last three decades"'' to conclude that laws against racial
attacks were necessary to preserve the peace and order of the community.
Illinois could thus rightly conclude that purveyors of racial and religious
hate "promote strife and tend powerfully to obstruct the manifold
adjustments required for free, ordered life in a metropolitan, polyglot
community."' 5 2 Illinois did not have to look past its borders to reach these
conclusions. Recalling events ranging from the murder in 1837 of the
abolitionist Elijah Lovejoy to riots in Cicero in 1951, Justice Frankfurter
argued that Illinois might reasonably conclude that racial tensions are
exacerbated and more likely to flare into violence when racial messages are
tolerated. 153
Justice Frankfurter also maintained that an individual's human dignity
may reasonably be treated as inextricably intertwined with protection for the
reputation of the individual's racial or religious group. It was not for the
Supreme Court, he said, to deny that the "Illinois legislature may
warrantably believe that a man's job and his educational opportunities and
the dignity accorded him may depend as much on the reputation of the racial
and religious group to which he willy-nilly belongs, as on his own
merits." 1
54
146. d. at 264.
147. Id. at 263 n.18.
148. Id.
149. See id. at 258.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 258-59.
152. Id. at 259.
153. Id.
154. id. at 263.
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Beauharnais drew explicit connections between criminal libel and civil
libel, equating the two for constitutional purposes, and treating both as
among those narrow classes of speech Chaplinsky had identified as outside
the First Amendment's protection. And indeed, if Beauharnais sustained
"criminal libel" against constitutional attack, the first two centuries of
American law similarly treated civil suits for libel or slander as outside the
ken of First Amendment protection, again fitting comfortably into
Chaplinsky's formulation that libels are words which by their very utterance
inflict injury. "'
The common law was strongly protective of reputation. Under
traditional common-law doctrine in the United States, the plaintiff did not
have to prove fault, falsity, or damage.1 56  The plaintiff merely had to
establish publication by the defendant of a defamatory statement, of and
concerning the plaintiff, to a third party. 157 Defamation was a strict liability
tort. 158  The plaintiff was not required to plead or prove fault by the
defendant. 159 No showing of negligent, reckless, or intentional publication
of falsehood was required. 160 Nor was the plaintiff required to prove that the
allegedly defamatory statements were false. 16' The onus was instead on the
defendant to plead and prove truth as a justification or defense to the libel. 162
Damages were presumed; the law assumed that damages flowed naturally
from the defamation. 1
63
These rules were the quintessential example of a legal regime
recognizing the existence of "words which by their very utterance inflict
injury" requiring remedies without additional proof of harm. Justice Holmes
captured this orthodoxy in Peck v. Tribune Co.,'64 embracing the common-
law aphorism that: "Whatever a man publishes he publishes at his peril.' ' 165
155. See supra notes 1-9 and accompanying text.
156. See, e.g., Wilson v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 642 F.2d 371, 374 (6th Cir. 1981).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. See, e.g., Chonich v. Wayne County Cmty. College, 973 F.2d 1271, 1276 (6th Cir. 1992)
("The common law of defamation is an oddity of tort law, for it allows recovery of purportedly
compensatory damages without evidence of actual loss. Under the traditional rules pertaining to
actions for libel, the existence of injury is presumed from the fact of publication. Juries may award
substantial sums as compensation for supposed damage to reputation without any proof that such
harm actually occurred.").
164. 214 U.S. 185 (1909).
165. Id. at 189 (quoting Lord Mansfield, in Rex v. Loft, 776, 881, 981 Eng. Rep. 914, 916
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As Holmes saw it, the reason for this was "plain," residing in the common-
law's common-sense presumption that hurtful words cause hurt.
The reason is plain. A libel is harmful on its face. If a man sees fit
to publish manifestly hurtful statements concerning an individual,
without other justification than exists for an advertisement or a
piece of news, the usual principles of tort will make him liable, if
the statements are false or are true only of someone else. 166
Modem First Amendment developments, however, would overtake both
the criminal libel principles of Beauharnais and the common-law "super
tort" of defamation. The most significant development was the historic
opinion of the Supreme Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. 167  The
rules emanating from New York Times and its progeny turned the common
law principles on their head, diminishing the protection of reputation in the
United States. The balance between protection of reputation and freedom of
speech that was struck by the common law was recalibrated, diminishing
protection of reputation and concomitantly enhancing protection of freedom
of speech. In the New York Times case, the Court held that in defamation
actions brought by public officials for defamatory speech germane to the
official's performance in or fitness for office, the public official plaintiff
must demonstrate that the defendant published the defamation with "actual
malice," defined as knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for truth or
falsity. 168 In a series of decisions following the New York Times decision,
the constitutional rules evolved to include "public figures" as among the
plaintiffs who must demonstrate actual malice. 169  While there have been
hundreds of decisions elaborating on the public figure/private figure
dichotomy, this basic division of American defamation law is now relatively
settled and stable. 1
70
(1774)); see also Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 159 n.4 (1979) (repeating Holmes' admonition).
166. Peck, 214 U.S. at 189.
167. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
168. Id. at 279-80.
169. The capstone of this evolution came in the 1974 decision in Gertz v, Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323 (1974). The case involved a libel action brought by Elmer Gertz, a well-known Chicago
attorney and law professor, against Robert Welch, Inc., the publisher of the monthly magazine
American Opinion, an organ of the John Birch Society. Id. at 326-27. The defendant claimed that
Gertz was a public figure and that the magazine was thus entitled to the protection of the New York
Times actual malice standard. Id. at 327-28. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that Gertz was
a private figure, and further holding that in private figure cases, the actual malice standard was not
required by the First Amendment. Id. at 352. The Court in Gertz left it to state courts to develop for
themselves the proper standard of liability in suits brought by private plaintiffs, so long as they did
not dip below the floor requirement of negligence. Id. at 347.
170. The Gertz decision recognized two kinds of public figures, the "all purpose" public figure, a
category limited to persons of such high prominence that they are deemed public figures for all
purposes, and the more common "limited purpose" public figure, those who have become involved
344
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The tort of defamation in the United States has thus been dramatically
modified. The changes have been accomplished principally by: (1) requiring
proof of fault in all defamation actions in the United States involving
"matters of public concern," including proof of, at minimum, negligence in
all such private-figure cases and "actual malice" in all such public official
and public figure cases;171 (2) placing the burden of pleading and proving
falsity on the plaintiff in all defamation issues involving matters of public
concern;'72 (3) modifying the common-law doctrine of "fair comment" to
impose a stricter requirement that all defamation actions be predicated on
false statements of fact;'73 and (4) modifying rules governing damages. 174
in specific public controversies and are public figures for purposes of defamatory statements arising
from their involvement in those controversies. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344-45. While American courts
have adopted a variety of tests to define limited-purpose public figures, the common denominator
among the tests is an emphasis on the existence of a pre-existing public controversy and an
examination of the extent to which a plaintiff has voluntarily injected himself or herself into that
controversy. See, e.g., Carr v. Forbes, Inc., 259 F.3d 273 (4th Cir. 2001); Contemporary Mission,
Inc. v. N.Y. Times Co., 842 F.2d 612, 617 (2d Cir. 1988); Waldbaum v. Fairchild Publ'ns, 627 F.2d
1287 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 898 (1980).
171. To establish actual malice a plaintiff must prove with clear and convincing evidence that the
defamatory statement was made "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not." N.Y Times Co., 376 U.S. at 280. Reckless disregard, in turn, means
that the publisher "in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication." St. Amant v.
Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968). To prove actual malice, therefore, a plaintiff must
"demonstrate with clear and convincing evidence that the defendant realized that his statement was
false or that he subjectively entertained serious doubt as to the truth of his statement." Bose Corp. v.
Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 511 n.30 (1984); see also McCoy v. Hearst
Corp., 727 P.2d 711 (Cal. 1986). Actual malice is a subjective standard. Harte-Hanks Commc'ns v.
Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 688 (1989). The critical question is state of mind. Herbert v. Lando,
441 U.S. 153 (1979). Actual malice is not to be equated with common-law malice. See Tavoulareas
v. Piro, 817 F.2d 762, 795 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("To recover, plaintiffs cannot ground their claim 'on a
showing of intent to inflict harm,' but must, instead, show an 'intent to inflict harm through
falsehood."'); Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356, 357 (1965).
172. In defamation cases in which the alleged defamatory falsehood arises from matters of
"public concern," plaintiffs in the United States now have the burden of proving that the allegedly
defamatory statements made are false. Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 777 (1986).
Minor, trivial, technical falsehoods will not support a defamation action. Masson v. New Yorker
Magazine, 501 U.S. 496, 516 (1991). Rather, the test is whether the "gist" or the "sting" of the
allegedly defamatory statements was different than publication of the literal truth would have been.
Id. at 517. The defendants are protected from liability for minor or trivial inaccuracies, but may be
held liable for statements that deviate in a material way from the truth. Id. The concept is a simple
one: a charge is not "substantially true" if the average reader would think differently of the plaintiff
had the actual facts been presented correctly. Id. As the Supreme Court in Masson explained: "Put
another way, the statement is not considered false unless it 'would have a different effect on the
mind of the reader from that which the pleaded truth would have produced."' Id. (citing ROBERT
SACK, LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS 138 (1980); Wehling v. Columbia Broad. Sys.,
721 F.2d 506, 509 (5th Cir. 1983); RODNEY SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION § 5.08 (1991)).
173. The "fair comment" privilege, as it was understood at common law, was not an absolute
privilege for any opinion or comment, but required that the comment be, as its name suggests, "fair."
345
These modifications of the common-law tort of defamation are all
limited to defamation actions that initially trigger the "coverage" of the First
Amendment. That coverage is predicated on a demonstration that the
defamatory statements relate to issues "of public concern." The phrase "of
public concern" is a term of art in American First Amendment law. It
figures most prominently in the government employment cases applying the
tests of Connick v. Meyers'75 and Pickering v. Board of Education,7 6
discussed above.' 77 The standard was applied by the Supreme Court in the
context of defamation in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders,
Inc. 178 The Dun & Bradstreet case involved the credit reporting agency Dun
& Bradstreet, which issued an inaccurate credit report about the plaintiff,
The privilege has been modified in the United States as a result of First Amendment principles. The
most important United States Supreme Court precedent on the issue is a case entitled Milkovich v.
Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990), established the principle that a statement that is not
reasonably understood by recipients of the communication as a statement of fact is not actionable.
This elemental proposition of defamation law in the United States may be expressed under a variety
of rubrics. The non-factual statement may be labeled an "opinion," or mere "rhetorical hyperbole,"
or mere "insult," "verbal abuse," or "epithet." Whatever the label, unless defamatory facts are
expressed or are implied, no action for defamation may be maintained. See, e.g., Nat'l Ass'n of
Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 286 (1974) (holding not actionable "lusty and imaginative
expression of contempt"). Lower state and federal courts in the United States differ somewhat in the
tests they apply to determine whether a statement may be reasonably interpreted as factual. In many
American jurisdictions, courts have adopted various multi-factor tests that weigh the totality of
circumstances to determine if the statements at issue are actionable. Such decisions often emphasize
such factors as (1) the author's choice of words; (2) whether the challenged statement is capable of
being objectively characterized as true or false; (3) the context of the challenged statement within the
writing or speech as a whole; and (4) the broader social context into which the statement fits. See,
e.g., Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 983 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127
(1985). The Supreme Court in Milkovich held that these broad multi-factor tests were not required
by the First Amendment, which contained no free-standing protection for the expression of
statements that are cast as "opinion." 497 U.S. at 19. At the same time, Milkovich reinforced the
doctrine that the First Amendment does require that defamation actions in the United States be
predicated on false statements of fact. Id. In the aftermath of Milkovich, many American
jurisdictions continue to employ multi-factor tests to determine whether defamatory statements are
actionable, treating these tests as elaborations on state common-law principles. New York is a
prominent example. See Immuno A.G. v. Moor-Jankowski, 567 N.E.2d 1270 (N.Y. 1991); 600 W.
115th St. Corp. v. Gutfeld, 603 N.E.2d 930 (N.Y. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 910 (1993). So too,
is Illinois. See Solaia Tech., LLC v. Specialty Pub. Co., 852 N.E.2d 825, 840 (N.Y. 2006) ("Several
considerations aid our analysis: whether the statement has a precise and readily understood meaning;
whether the statement is verifiable; and whether the statement's literary or social context signals that
it has factual content.").
174. First Amendment principles now modify common-law defamation rules in the United States
governing damages. In the Gertz decision, the Supreme Court banned the award of both common-
law presumed damages and punitive damages in all cases involving issues of public concern, unless
the plaintiff demonstrates "actual malice." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974).
See generally N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (defining actual malice as
"knowledge that [the statement] was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not").
175. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
176. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
177. See supra notes 113-118 and accompanying text.
178. 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1983) (Powell, J., plurality).
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Greenmoss Builders, a residential and commercial building contractor.
179
After reviewing the history of constitutional developments, Justice Powell,
writing the Court's plurality opinion, stated that the Court had "never
considered whether the Gertz balance obtains when the defamatory
statements involve no issue of public concern."' 180 Writing that "[w]e have
long recognized that not all speech is of equal First Amendment
importance," Justice Powell stated that "speech on 'matters of public
concern'... is 'at the heart of the First Amendment[ ],,,181 which 'was
fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of
political and social change."" 182 The plurality opinion in Dun & Bradstreet
did little to define the phrase "matters of public concern," holding simply
that the issue was to be determined by [the expression's] content, form, and
context... as revealed by the whole record."" 83 Courts applying the "public
concern" formulation thus usually evaluate factors such as the degree to
which the defamatory statements were widely disseminated, the extent to
which they would be of interest to persons other than the immediate parties,
and the extent to which they implicate issues of public policy, art, science,
religion, business, and similar topics of broad social and cultural concern.
The "matters of public concern" standard, operating as an "on-off
switch" for First Amendment protection, parallels a doctrinal element
embedded in the constitutional test for "obscenity" under Miller v.
California.184  The Miller "obscenity" test requires that speech not be
classified as obscene if it has serious redeeming "literary, artistic, political,
or scientific value."' 8 5 Speech that is not obscene under the Miller standard
will enjoy First Amendment protection. 186 In this sense, a significant piece
of Chaplinsky continues to survive. To the extent that the theoretical
rationale articulated in Chaplinsky for treating some words as outside the
ambit of the First Amendment is their lack of any serious claim to being an
"essential part of any exposition of ideas,"' 87 and the concomitant judgment
that they are "of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit
that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in
179. Id.at 751.
180. Id. at 757.
181. Id. at 758-59 (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978)); see
generally Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 759 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983)).
182. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 759.
183. Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 761 (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48).
184. 413 U.S. 15 (1973); see infra notes 185-88 and accompanying text.
185. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
186. Id.
187. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
order and morality,"'' 8  the "public concern" and "redeeming value"
elements of defamation and obscenity law may thus be viewed as
incorporating and elaborating upon this standard from Chaplinsky.
If New York Times Co. v. Sullivan189 and its progeny dramatically
modified that part of Chaplinsky that treated all libels as words which by
their very utterance inflict injury, narrowing the reach of that side of
Chaplinksy to the smaller set of "garden variety" defamation actions that do
not involve any issues of public concern, an even wider array of modem
First Amendment doctrines have effectively overruled the criminal libel
principles of Beauharnais v. Illinois.'90
To begin, it is clear that at the very least, the actual malice standard
announced in New York Times applies to all criminal libel statutes. 19' A
second offshoot of the New York Times line of cases has been the rejection
of "group libel" in the sense of generalized and undifferentiated
disparagement of large groups, such as ethnic or racial groups. This is
crystallized in the principle that the common-law requirement that
defamation be "of and concerning" the specific plaintiff is now understood
as a principle of constitutional dimension.
In Rosenblatt v. Baer,'92 for example, the Supreme Court held that the
"of and concerning" component of American libel law is so critical to the
balance between protection of reputation and protection of free expression
that it must be understood as required by the Constitution itself.1 93 The
Court in Rosenblatt refused to accept as constitutionally sufficient a theory
that a cause of action could be maintained against a publication that cast
"indiscriminate suspicion" on members of a group who were allegedly
responsible for the conduct of a county ski recreation area. 194 The Court in
Rosenblatt held that this tightly constrained understanding of the "of and
concerning" requirement was essential to maintain the integrity of the
principles established in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. To allow the jury
to equate statements made about a group (such as a government agency)
with statements defaming the head of the group (such as the head of the
agency) merely on the presumption that to libel one is to libel the other, the
Court explained, was "to invite the specter of prosecutions for libel on
government, which the Constitution does not tolerate in any form." Such "'a
188. Id.
189. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
190. 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
191. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 67 (1964) (striking down criminal libel law for failing to
incorporate the actual malice standard).
192. 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
193. Id. at 83.
194. Id. ("A theory that the column cast indiscriminate suspicion on the members of the group
responsible for the conduct of this governmental operation is tantamount to a demand for recovery
based on libel of government, and therefore is constitutionally insufficient.").
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proposition may not constitutionally be utilized to establish that an otherwise
impersonal attack on governmental operations was a libel of an official
responsible for those operations."' 1 9' The constitutional stature of the "of
and concerning" requirement, and its integral link to the preservation of
195. Id. (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 292 (1964)). The Court in Rosenblatt
thus reaffirmed that "[t]here must be evidence showing that the attack was read as specifically
directed at the plaintiff." Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 81. The free speech values animating decisions
such as New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and Rosenblatt v. Baer, which had their origin in the context
of criticism of government and government officials, have been extended in their application to
protect criticism of individuals and corporations in the private sector on the theory that in a free and
democratic society, it is vital to guard freedom of speech on a wide range of subjects, including
religion, science, business, the arts, and other fields of human endeavor that comprise modem
culture. In American libel law, the most famous explication of this view came in an opinion by
Chief Justice Earl Warren in Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), and its companion
decision, Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967):
Since the depression of the 1930's and World War II there has been a rapid fusion of
economic and political power, a merging of science, industry, and government, and a
high degree of interaction between the intellectual, governmental, and business worlds.
Depression, war, international tensions, national and international markets, and the
surging growth of science and technology have precipitated national and international
problems that demand national and international solutions. While these trends and events
have occasioned a consolidation of governmental power, power has also become much
more organized in what we have commonly considered to be the private sector. In many
situations, policy determinations which traditionally were channeled through formal
political institutions are now originated and implemented through a complex array of
boards, committees, commissions, corporations, and associations, some only loosely
connected with the Government. This blending of positions and power has also occurred
in the case of individuals so that many who do not hold public office at the moment are
nevertheless intimately involved in the resolution of important public questions or, by
reason of their fame, shape events in areas of concern to society at large.
Curtis Publ'g Co., 388 U.S. at 163 (Warren, C.J., concurring); see also Milkovich v. Loraine Journal
Co., 497 U.S. 1, 14 (1990) (explaining why the Court has extended the constitutional standard "'to
protect defamatory criticism of nonpublic persons' who are ... intimately involved in the resolution
of important public questions, or by reason of their fame, shape events in areas of concern to society
at large."' (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 336-37 (1974))); see also Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc. 418 U.S. 323, 338-39 (1974) (explaining high levels of constitutional protection
for allegedly libelous speech involving attacks on public figures by emphasizing that public figures
invite scrutiny of their actions by virtue of their assumption of prominent roles in society, and have
access to channels of communication to counter allegedly defamatory charges made against them);
Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 673-674 (1944) ("One of the prerogatives of American
citizenship is the right to criticize public men and measures .... ). This notion has been extended in
America to include caustic attacks on well-known religious figures. See Hustler Magazine v.
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 51 (striking down verdict against magazine by prominent religious leader
Reverend Jerry Falwell, noting that "[t]he sort of robust political debate encouraged by the First
Amendment is bound to produce speech that is critical of those who hold public office or those
public figures who are 'intimately involved in the resolution of important public questions or, by
reason of their fame, shape events in areas of concern to society at large."'). These values in turn
embrace the "of and concerning" requirement extending it, as a matter of American constitutional
doctrine, to libels involving persons outside of government. See, e.g., Blatty v. N.Y. Times Co., 728
P.2d 1177, 1182 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
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freedom of speech, is thus a well-accepted aspect of American defamation
law. 196
Aside from these defamation-related additions to First Amendment
doctrine, there is the entire mainstream body of modem First Amendment
law that has dramatically tightened the rules of immediacy, intent, and
likelihood of harm required to justify restrictions on speech on the theory the
speech will lead to violence. This is not truly the "inflict injury" prong of
Chaplinksy, but more properly understood as that part of Chaplinksy linked
to genuine "fighting words" and the maintenance of physical (as opposed to
moral) order. Even so, the strong body of law expressly limiting the fighting
words doctrine to face-to-face confrontations likely to provoke immediate
violence, when coupled with the tightened modem First Amendment
doctrines governing liability for "incitement" '1 97 or "true threats,"' 98
effectively eviscerates Beauharnais as precedent. In Purtell v. Mason,199 for
example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently
expressed skepticism that the "words which by their very utterance inflict
injury" prong of Chaplinsky remained alive at all in connection with laws
dealing with fighting words or incitement. "Although Chaplinsky purported
to define fighting words in the alternative-words that 'by their very
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace,' 200 the court observed, "the statute under challenge in the case had
been definitively construed by the state courts to apply only to speech falling
196. See, e.g., Auvil v. CBS "60 Minutes," 800 F. Supp. 928, 933, 937 (E.D. Wash. 1992)
("Among the prophylactic rules designed to serve First Amendment values is the threshold
requirement that the injured party demonstrate that the defamatory (or as here disparaging)
communication was personally directed to him or (as here) to the product."); lsuzu Motors Ltd. v.
Consumers Union, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1044 (C.D. Cal. 1998) ("In defamation actions, the
First Amendment requires the plaintiff to establish that the statement on which the claim is based is
'of and concerning' the plaintiff."); Ferlauoto v. Hamsher, 74 Cal. App. 4th 1394, 1404 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1999); (Plaintiff "cannot constitutionally establish liability unless he proves that the contested
statements are 'of and concerning,' him either by name or by 'clear implication."'); Saenz v. Morris,
746 P.2d 159 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987) (discussing constitutional underpinnings of the "of and
concerning" requirement); Dong v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Univ., 236 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1987)
("In defamation actions the First Amendment requires that the statement on which the claim is based
must specifically refer to, or be 'of and concerning,' the plaintiff ....") (internal quotations
omitted); Blatty v. N.Y. Times Co., 728 P.2d 1177, 1182 (1987) ("In defamation actions the First
Amendment also requires that the statement on which the claim is based must specifically refer to, or
be 'of and concerning,' the plaintiff in some way. . . . [T]he requirement derives directly and
ultimately from the First Amendment.").
197. See, e.g, Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
198. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359-60 (2003) (holding that "'true threats' encompass those
statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an
act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals .... Intimidation in the
constitutionally proscribable sense of the word is a type of true threat, where a speaker directs a
threat to a person or group of persons with the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or
death.").
199. 527 F.3d 615, 624 (7th Cir. 2008).
200. Id. at 623.
350
[Vol. 36: 317, 2009] The Evolving Treatment of Speech
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
in the latter category."2 °1  The court in Purtell also asserted that in
subsequent decisions the Supreme Court had not breathed life into the
"inflict injury" program of Chaplinsky, stating that "[i]n later cases, the
Court has either dropped the 'inflict-injury' alternative altogether or simply
recited the full Chaplinsky definition without further reference to any
distinction between merely hurtful speech and speech that tends to provoke
an immediate breach of the peace. 2 °2 The court thus claimed:
Although the "inflict-injury" alternative in Chaplinsky's definition
of fighting words has never been expressly overruled, the Supreme
Court has never held that the government may, consistent with the
First Amendment, regulate or punish speech that causes emotional
injury but does not have a tendency to provoke an immediate breach
203
of the peace.
The court thus concluded that the theoretical and constitutional policy
justification in modem First Amendment jurisprudence for "'plac[ing]
fighting words outside the protection of the First Amendment' is not their
capacity to inflict emotional injury-many words do that-but their
tendency 'to provoke a violent reaction and hence a breach of the peace.',
2 04
Finally, Beauharnais is flatly inconsistent with modem First
Amendment doctrines restraining content-based and view-point based
discrimination, doctrines that have been applied rigorously to protect "hate
201. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
202. Id. (citing "Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (a cross-burning case decided on
threat-doctrine grounds in which the Court quoted the full Chaplinsky test but noted Cohen v.
California's narrowing of the fighting-words doctrine); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 409, (1989)
(in throwing out a flag-burning conviction, the Court dropped the inflict-injury prong of the
Chaplinsky definition and confined fighting words to those that are 'likely to provoke the average
person to retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of the peace') (internal quotes omitted); NAACP v.
Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 927 (1982) (describing fighting words as 'those that
provoke immediate violence'); Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 132 (1974) (quoting full
Chaplinsky definition but omitting any reference to the inflict-injury prong); Gooding v. Wilson, 405
U.S. 518, 524-27 (1972) (same); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) (modifying definition
of fighting words to encompass 'those personally abusive epithets which, when addressed to the
ordinary citizen, are, as a matter of common knowledge, inherently likely to provoke violent
reaction'); Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (stating speech is protected 'unless
shown likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above
public inconvenience, annoyance, or unrest ... [;][t]here is no room under our Constitution for a
more restrictive view'); see also R.A. V.v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 414 (1992) (White, J.,
concurring) ('The mere fact that expressive activity causes hurt feelings, offense, or resentment does
not render the expression unprotected.')") (internal citations omitted).
203. Purtell, 527 F.3d 615, 624 (7th Cir. 2008).
204. Id. at 624.
speech" of exactly the sort that the Court held unprotected in
Beauharnais.2 5  Thus in R.A.V v. City of St. Paul,20 6 the Supreme Court
struck down a hate speech ordinance, and along the way severely critiqued
any understanding of Chaplinsky as creating categories of speech "invisible
to the Constitution. 2 °7 And in Virginia v. Black,0 8 a somewhat splintered
array of opinions "split the baby" in a constitutional attack on Virginia's
anti-cross-burning law, holding that laws prohibiting cross-burning for the
purpose of threatening or intimidating other persons were not per se
violations of the First Amendment, but that a particular provision of the
Virginia law at issue, which created a presumption of an intent to intimidate
from the mere fact of cross-burning alone, rendered the application of the
statute unconstitutional as to a Ku Klux Klan defendant to whom the
presumption had been applied.209
In the plurality opinion in Virginia v. Black, Justice O'Connor did
invoke Chaplinsky's famous passage,21 but this was followed by the
concession that the Court had narrowed the fighting words concept
and tightened standards for incitement."' In a critical passage, Justice
O'Connor's opinion admonished that:
It may be true that a cross burning, even at a political rally, arouses
a sense of anger or hatred among the vast majority of citizens who
see a burning cross. But this sense of anger or hatred is not
sufficient to ban all cross burnings. As Gerald Gunther has stated,
"The lesson I have drawn from my childhood in Nazi Germany and
my happier adult life in this country is the need to walk the
sometimes difficult path of denouncing the bigot's hateful ideas
205. See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 251-67 (1952).
206. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
207. Id. at 383-84 ("We have sometimes said that these categories of expression are 'not within
the area of constitutionally protected speech,' Roth, supra, 354 U.S., at 483.; Beauharnais, supra,
343 U.S., at 266; Chaplinsky, supra, 315 U.S., at 571-572; or that the 'protection of the First
Amendment does not extend' to them, Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466
U.S. 485, 504 (1984); Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 124 ... (1989)
(internal citations omitted). Such statements must be taken in context, however, and are no more
literally true than is the occasionally repeated shorthand characterizing obscenity 'as not being
speech at all,' Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 Duke L.J. 589, 615, n.146.
What they mean is that these areas of speech can, consistently with the First Amendment, be
regulated because of their constitutionally proscribable content (obscenity, defamation, etc.)-not
that they are categories of speech entirely invisible to the Constitution, so that they may be made the
vehicles for content discrimination unrelated to their distinctively proscribable content. Thus, the
government may proscribe libel; but it may not make the further content discrimination of
proscribing only libel critical of the government.").
208. 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (plurality opinion).
209. See id. at 347-68.
210. Id. at 358.
211. Id.
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with all my power, yet at the same time challenging any
community's attempt to suppress hateful ideas by force of law."
The prima facie evidence provision in this case ignores all of the
contextual factors that are necessary to decide whether a particular
cross burning is intended to intimidate. The First Amendment does
not permit such a shortcut.212
The plurality's holding regarding the prima facie evidence provision
was a significant limitation on the notion in Chaplinsky and Beauharnais
that certain words may by their very utterance inflict injury, by in effect
permitting the government to "brand" certain speech, in a kind of First
Amendment variant of a Bill of Attainder, declaring it by name to be a
message that presumptively violates the law. This type of advance
"branding" was once permitted under our Constitution. It was exactly this
method of regulation that drew one of Justice Holmes's great free speech
dissents, in Gitlow v. New York,2 13 in which he argued vociferously against
the proposition that the New York legislature could declare in advance that
certain utterances constituted, intrinsically, a clear and present danger. In a
haunting admonition, Justice Holmes warned: "Every idea is an
incitement., 214 This branding device, however, is permitted no longer. The
views of Justice Holmes have prevailed over time, and the Supreme Court,
in Black and other cases, has now rejected the notion that a legislature may
determine, in advance and in the abstract, that a certain word, symbol, or
phrase is effectively taboo in public discourse, attaching legal penalties to its
mere utterance or display.215
212. Id. at 366-67 (internal citation omitted). Justice Souter, joined by Justices Kennedy and
Ginsburg, took an even stronger free speech position than Justice O'Connor, relying on R.A. V.
Those three Justices would have struck down the entire Virginia law, and all three convictions,
because the law was tainted with the same kinds of viewpoint-based and content-based distinctions
that the Court had found constitutionally impermissible in R.A. V. See id. at 380-87. Justices Scalia
and Thomas, apparently defecting from their positions in R.A. V., would have gone well beyond the
plurality. Justice Thomas would have been willing to allow a state to attack all cross burnings, and
to permit a state to employ a prima facie evidence provision, and would have affirmed all three
convictions. Id. at 388-400. Justice Scalia wrote primarily to express the view that the prima facie
evidence provision is probably a mere permissible inference of the sort that in his view would not
violate the First Amendment. Id. at 368-80.
213. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
214. Id. at 673 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
215. See Landmark Commc'n., Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 843 (1978) ("This legislative
declaration coupled with the stipulated fact that Landmark published the disputed article was
regarded by the court as sufficient to justify imposition of criminal sanctions. Deference to a
legislative finding cannot limit judicial inquiry when First Amendment rights are at stake."); Cohen
v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) ("Finally, and in the same vein, we cannot indulge the facile
If there is an exception to this statement, however, that exception is the
one final category recognized in Chaplinsky in which it may still be largely
plausible to maintain that certain words or images are deemed by their very
publication to inflict injury-expression deemed legally obscene.2 16
C. The Lewd and Obscene
In Roth v. United States,2t 7 the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice
Brennan, held that obscenity was not protected by the First Amendment.
Roth was directly linked to Chaplinsky. The Court in Roth quoted the
famous passage in Chaplinsky that included the "lewd and obscene" as
among the categories of speech outside the protection of the Constitution.21 8
Immediately following the Chaplinsky quotation, the Court in Roth
emphatically and economically declared: "We hold that obscenity is not
within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press., 219 Roth rested
heavily on history, and Roth linked the various categories in Chaplinksy into
a unified whole, treating profanity, libel, and obscenity as legal cousins, all
left orphaned by the First Amendment. The Court thus reinforced the
declarations it borrowed from Chaplinsky with the data that in 1792, when
ten of the fourteen states had ratified the Constitution, thirteen of the
fourteen states provided for the prosecution of libel,220 and every state "made
either blasphemy or profanity, or both, statutory crimes."
221
assumption that one can forbid particular words without also running a substantial risk of
suppressing ideas in the process. Indeed, governments might soon seize upon the censorship of
particular words as a convenient guise for banning the expression of unpopular views."); Herdon v.
Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 258 (1937) ("The power of a state to abridge freedom of speech and of
assembly is the exception rather than the rule and the penalizing even of utterances of a defined
character must find its justification in a reasonable apprehension of danger to organized government.
The judgment of the Legislature is not unfettered."); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 378
(1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("This legislative declaration ... does not preclude enquiry into the
question whether, at the time and under the circumstances, the conditions existed which are essential
to validity under the Federal Constitution.").
216. See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
217. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
218. Id. at 485 (quoting Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72).
219. Id.
220. Id. at 482 n. 1 (citing Act to Secure the Freedom of the Press (1804), 1 Conn. Pub. Stat.
Laws 355 (1808); DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. 1, § 5; Ga. Penal Code, Eighth Div., § VIII (1817),
Digest of the Laws of Ga. 364 (Prince 1822); Act of 1803, c. 54, It Md. Public General Laws 1096
(Poe 1888); Commonwealth v. Kneeland, 37 Mass. 206, 232 (1838); Act for the Punishment of
Certain Crimes Not Capital (1791), 1792 N.H. Laws 253; Act Respecting Libels (1799), N.J. Rev.
Laws 411 (1800); People v. Croswell, 3 Johns. 337 (N.Y. 1804); Act of 1803, c. 632, 1821 2 N.C.
Laws 999; PA. CONST. 1790, art. IX, § 7; R.I. Code of Laws (1647), Proceedings of the First General
Assembly & Code of Laws 44-45 (1647); R.I. CONST., 1842, art. 1, § 20; Act of 1804, 1 Laws of Vt.
366 (Tolman 1808); Commonwealth v. Morris, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 176 (1811).
221. Id, at 482-83 n.12 (citing Act for the Punishment of Divers Capital and Other Felonies, 1784
Acts and Laws of Conn. 66, 67; Act Against Drunkenness, Blasphemy, §§ 4-5 (1737), 1 Del. Laws
173, 174 (1797); Act to Regulate Taverns (1786), Digest of the Laws of Ga. 512, 513 (Prince 1822);
354
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Roth was also directly linked to Beauharnais.2 Citing its holding in
Beauharnais, the Court in Roth reasoned that if libel was not protected by
the First Amendment, surely obscenity was also not protected. 3 While
"[a]t the time of the adoption of the First Amendment," the Court conceded,
"obscenity law was not as fully developed as libel law," there was,
nonetheless, ample contemporary evidence that obscenity, like libel, was not
within the constitutional definition of freedom of speech. 4
Invoking the values of the "marketplace of ideas" and central
relationship of freedom of speech to democratic self-governance, the Court
in Roth argued that "[t]he protection given speech and press was fashioned
to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political
and social changes desired by the people. 2 25 Echoing the reasoning of
Chaplinksy, the Court in Roth reasoned that obscenity made no contributions
to the marketplace of ideas or the political process:
All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance-
unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the
prevailing climate of opinion-have the full protection of the
guaranties, unless excludable because they encroach upon the
limited area of more important interests. But implicit in the history
Act of 1723, c. 16, § 1, Digest of the Laws of Md. 92 (Herty 1799); General Laws and Liberties of
Mass. Bay, c. XVIII, § 3 (1646), Mass. Bay Colony Charters & Laws 58 (1814); Act of 1782, c. 8,
Rev. Stat. of Mass. 741, § 15 (1836); Act of 1798, c. 33, §§ 1, 3, Rev. Stat. of Mass. 741, § 16
(1836); Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Not Capital (1791), N.H. Laws 1792, 252, 256
(1792); Act for the Punishment of Profane Cursing and Swearing (1791), N.H. Laws 1792, 258; Act
for Suppressing Vice and Immorality, §§ VIII-LX (1798), N.J. Rev. Laws 329, 331 (1800); Act for
Suppressing Immorality, § IV (1788), 2 N.Y. Laws 257, 258 (Jones & Varick 1777-1789); People v.
Ruggles, 8 Johns. 290 (N.Y. 1811); Act ... for the More Effectual Suppression of Vice and
Immorality, § 11 (1741), N.C. Laws 52 (Martin Rev. 1715-1790); Act to Prevent the Grievous Sins
of Cursing & Swearing (1700), II Statutes at Large of Pa. 49 (1700-1712); Act for the Prevention of
Vice and Immorality, § 11 (1794), 3 Laws of Pa. 177, 178 (1791-1802); Act to Reform the Penal
Laws, §§ 33-34 (1798), R.I. Laws 1798 584, 595; Act for the More Effectual Suppressing of
Blasphemy & Prophaneness (1703), Laws of S.C. 4 (Grimke 1790); Act for the Punishment of
Certain Capital, and Other High Crimes and Misdemeanors, § 20 (1797), I Laws of Vt. 332, 339
(Tolman 1808); Act for the Punishment of Certain Inferior Crimes & Misdemeanors, § 20 (1797), 1
Vt. Laws 352, 361 (Tolman 1808); Act for the Effectual Suppression of Vice, § 1 (1792), Acts of
General Assembly of Va. 286 (1794).).
222. Beauhamais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
223. Id. at 483 (citing Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 266).
224. Id. at 483-84 n.13, (citing Act Concerning Crimes and Punishments, § 69 (1821), Stat. Laws
of Conn. 109 (1824); Knowles v. State, 3 Day 103 (Conn. 1808); Rev. Stat. of 1835, c. 130, § 10,
Rev. Stat. of Mass. 740 (1836); Commonwealth v. Holmes, 17 Mass. 335; Rev. Stat. of 1842, c. 113,
§ 2, Rev. Stat. of N.H. 221 (1843); Act for Suppressing Vice & Immorality, § XII (1798), N.J. Rev.
Laws 329, 331 (1800); Commonwealth v. Sharpless, 2 Serg. & Rawle 91 (Pa. 1815).).
225. Id. at 484.
of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly
without redeeming social importance.126
The Court in Roth was invited to engage the defense argument that
obscenity statutes are forms of thought control. The defendants in Roth
argued that obscenity laws "punish incitation to impure sexual thoughts, not
shown to be related to any overt antisocial conduct which is or may be
incited in the persons stimulated to such thoughts., 227 Rather than directly
confront this argument, the Court in Roth mechanically avoided it. If
obscenity did not fall within the protection of the First Amendment, the
Court reasoned, then no showing of "clear and present danger of antisocial
conduct' '22 was required, because such First Amendment protections were
only activated. Just as no "clear and present danger" was required to ban the
libels in Beauharnais, no "clear and present danger" was required to ban the
obscenity in Roth.229
Once it was established that "obscenity" was not entitled to any First
Amendment protection, the remaining doctrinal task was to define it. The
Court would struggle with this process until,230 in Miller v. California,2 1 the
Court settled on a three-pronged test:
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community
standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to
the prurient interest;2 32 (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in
a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the
applicable state law;233 and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole,
lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.234
While Miller refined the doctrinal elements of Roth, it did not alter
Roth's underlying jurisprudence.
226. Id. (footnote omitted).
227. Id. at 485-86.
228. Id. at 486 (footnote omitted).
229. Id. at 486-87 (quoting Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 266) ("'Libelous utterances not being within
the area of constitutionally protected speech, it is unnecessary, either for us or for the State courts, to
consider the issues behind the phrase "clear and present danger." Certainly no one would contend
that obscene speech, for example, may be punished only upon a showing of such circumstances.
Libel, as we have seen, is in the same class."').
230. See, e.g., Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
231. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
232. Id. at 24.
233. Id.
234. Id.
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IV. CONCLUSION
In Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485,
504 (1984), Justice Stevens concluded:
Nevertheless, there are categories of communication and certain
special utterances to which the majestic protection of the First
Amendment does not extend because they "are no essential part of
any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step
to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.
235
We might usefully conceptualize the history of American free speech
debate as a contest between two alternative approaches to free speech
regulation, both of which are suggested by language in Chaplinsky. One
approach, that is reflected in the phrase "words which by their very utterance
inflict injury,', 23 6 suggests that it may be appropriate for society to prohibit
and punish certain expression because the expression itself is inherently
harmful. The words themselves are "bullets" that inflict injury. No
extraneous proof of injury, no additional assessment of causation or
imminence or likelihood of damage, is required to justify laws that penalize
their utterance. Doctrinal formulations such as "clear and present danger" or
"directed to the incitement of imminent lawless action and likely to produce
such action" or "strict scrutiny" are essentially irrelevant under this
approach, for there is no need to connect the offending speech to any
external harm. The words by their utterance are deemed to inflict injury.
The alternative approach rejects the notion that words may ever be
banned on the grounds that they are intrinsically harmful. "Sticks and stones
may break my bones but words will never hurt me." The second approach
instead presumes that all speech is presumptively free speech, and that it is
to remain unshackled by government unless the government comes forward
with compelling justifications for its abridgments. The naked assertion that
the speech is somehow inherently evil will not be credited as such a
compelling justification. Under this approach, it is incumbent on the
government to defend laws restricting expression by demonstrating that the
expression is linked to some extraneous harm, to some palpable invasion of
a legally protected societal or individual interest, such as national security or
235. 466 U.S. 485, 504 (1984) (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572
(1942)).
236. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572.
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individual reputation or privacy. In the absence of such a showing, the
metaphorical marketplace of ideas, not the fiat of government, should decide
the value of speech.
Even under the second approach, protection for speech may wax and
wane, depending on what legal doctrines are employed to articulate the
required link between the potentially dangerous speech and the ensuing
harm. The required link between the speech and the harm may be loose or
tight, and the relative looseness or tightness of the link required will tell us
whether the protection for freedom of speech is low or high. When the link-
rules are loose, protection of speech is diminished. When expression could
be punished merely because it had the "bad tendency" to lead to violence,
protection was low, and many dissidents and protesters went to jail. When,
as under current doctrine, expression may be punished only after tight
requirements of intent, immediacy, and likelihood of causation are
established, it is far more difficult for the government to punish dissent and
protest.
The two approaches to free speech regulation that I have described have
coexisted in American law for decades, and are both embedded in the
famous passage from Chaplinsky.23 7  Logically, this coexistence is
unobjectionable. It is perfectly tenable to maintain a regime of free speech
regulation in which certain utterances are treated as inherently harmful, and
thus subject to prohibition, while other utterances are treated as potentially
harmful, and thus subject to prohibition if certain preconditions are met.
Such a scheme makes as much logical sense as the bifurcated approach to
fault that exists in modem tort law, in which certain activities are subject to
strict liability standards, and other activities subject to degrees of fault-
typically negligence.
While such a bifurcated regime for free speech regulation may be
logically tenable, it is theoretically unstable. Tension exists between the
theoretical underpinnings and practical applications of the two approaches.
The tension arises because the core assumption of the "inherently
dangerous" formulation, as so efficiently articulated by Chaplinsky, is that
government is largely competent to identify those classes of speech that are
inherently dangerous, by assessing them to be of such slight value to the
pursuit of truth and free exchange of ideas that they may appropriately be
banned in the interest of good order and morality. That core assumption is
directly at odds with the core assumption of the marketplace theory, which
posits that government is largely incompetent to make these judgments, and
that instead the best test of the truth or value of expression is its capacity to
gain currency in the marketplace.238 Moreover, the marketplace theory
237. See supra note 5.
238. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting.) ("But when men
have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than
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soundly rejects the notion that government may enshrine in law society's
collective disgust or revulsion for certain speech by banishing such speech
from the marketplace. "If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First
Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an
idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or
disagreeable. 239
One of the doctrinal devices that has evolved to mitigate this tension is
the doctrine of "independent appellate review," which requires courts to
engage in an independent and searching assessment of the application of
First Amendment standards to specific facts, so as to assure that the borders
of the categorical doctrines are conscientiously policed, and to determine
that categories of unprotected expression do not become manipulated so as
to undermine the principles of neutrality that are at the core of modern First
Amendment law.240
American free speech law may never fully resolve this tension. There
has, however, been a paradigm shift taking place over the last several
decades, a shift away from the inherently dangerous speech formulation as
the dominant mode of analysis. The inherently dangerous speech
formulation is now the recessive mode, and the marketplace theory the
dominant. Moreover, within ambit of the marketplace theory, the linkage
they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better
reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself
accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes
safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment, as
all life is an experiment. Every year if not every day we have to wager our salvation upon some
prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge. While that experiment is part of our system I think that
we should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of opinions that we loathe
and believe to be fraught with death, unless they so imminently threaten immediate interference with
the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is required to save the
country.").
239. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989).
240. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 504-05 (1984). ("In each of these
areas, the limits of the unprotected category, as well as the unprotected character of particular
communications, have been determined by the judicial evaluation of special facts that have been
deemed to have constitutional significance. In such cases, the Court has regularly conducted an
independent review of the record both to be sure that the speech in question actually falls within the
unprotected category and to confine the perimeters of any unprotected category within acceptably
narrow limits in an effort to ensure that protected expression will not be inhibited. Providing triers
of fact with a general description of the type of communication whose content is unworthy of
protection has not, in and of itself, served sufficiently to narrow the category, nor served to eliminate
the danger that decisions by triers of fact may inhibit the expression of protected ideas. The
principle of viewpoint neutrality that underlies the First Amendment itself, see Police Department of
Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972), also imposes a special responsibility on judges
whenever it is claimed that a particular communication is unprotected. See generally Terminiello v.
Chicago, 337 U.S. 1,4 (1949).") (internal citations omitted).
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requirements-the doctrinal rules that express the required connection
between the potentially dangerous utterance and the ensuing harm-have
tightened. The overall effect of this shifting paradigm is to broaden
protection of freedom of speech, at the expense of other societal and
individual interests.
The narrative set forth here is not, however, entirely linear or entirely
consistent. Law is rarely so neat. Strong "pockets of persistence" remain, in
which the inherently dangerous expression mode of thinking continues to
dominate, or at least exert a strong gravitational pull. Moreover, adding to
the complexity, there are several areas of free speech doctrine in which the
two modes are blended. In such instances the overall level of free speech
protection is a function of the relative influence of each element in the mix.
This juxtaposition of values in mutual tension is precisely what has
given Justice Murphy's famous passage in Chaplinsky its rhetorical staying
power over time. The Chaplinsky passage recognized the competing vision
of the national identity as a "marketplace" or a "moral place." As
Chaplinsky and its subsequent history suggest, perhaps the nation, and our
system of free expression, will always partake of both.
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